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IN Mi l ' I J I A I I C O I I I M <>l<' AJMM'Al.S 
STATE OF UTAH, 
I ' l . i iniiu \ p p t i k c , 
vs. 
TROY ANTHONY BRINAR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case Nos. 20080812-CA 
20080813-C A 
20080814-CA 
20080815-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is otherwise conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §§ 77-18a-l and 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953 as amended). Other issues relating to 
jurisdiction are discussed below. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. The threshold determination in Mr. Brinar's appeal is whether this Court 
lacks jurisdiction over appeal issues relating to the improper entry <>i IH.N guilty pleas and 
prim Hiuiisd's l.iilim lohh ,ipprnpn,iU ,n lions IIMMIIIIIMW Ins rlienl's pk'us Questions 
of law are reviewed for correctness. State v. Tenorio, 156 P.3d 854, 2007 UT App 92. 
I' K b^SERVAl ION OF THE AK<;i IMI, Nl 
'' brief is filed because Mr. Brinar's arguments have not been 
preserved. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Sta^ v Clayton, 639P.2d 168 
(Utah 1981). 
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STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The texts of the following relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are 
contained in this brief or Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (Withdrawal of Plea) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-101 et seq (Post-Conviction Remedies Act) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (Post-conviction relief) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The District Attorney's office filed four cases against Mr. Brinar (Cases 
081400122; 081401032; 081401294; 081401405). On or about July 1, 2008, during a 
change of plea proceedings which encompassed all of the pending cases, Mr. Brinar 
pleaded guilty to Burglary, a 2nd degree felony (case 081400122); Theft by Deception, a 
3rd degree felony (case 08401032); Kidnapping, a 3rd degree felony (case 081401294); 
and Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle, a 3rd degree felony (case 081401405). 
On or about August 22, 2008, the trial court sentenced Mr. Brinar to, inter alia, 
indeterminate prison terms of 1-15 years for Burglary; followed by a consecutive sentence 
of 0-5 years for Theft by Deception; followed by a consecutive sentence of 0-5 years for 
Kidnapping; and finally followed by a consecutive sentence of 0-5 years for Receiving or 
Transferring a Stolen Vehicle. R 56, pg 32. Prior to, or contemporaneous with, the 
sentencing proceeding (held on August 22, 2008), no evidence exists in the record as to 
Mr. Brinar's intent to withdraw his guilty pleas (entered July 1, 2008). Instead, off-the-
record discussions took place between Mr. Brinar and his attorney. 
-2-
On or about September 9, 2008, Mr. Brinar filed a motion which, inter alia, 
prior " on 111M; I P f r. Brinar's motion 
I, Troy Brinar hereby ask V .-»*: ••~.-* " ~<>ur for \ neu fual and/or proceedings. 
Based on the ineffectiveness of v UUHNCI and the fact that f was forced by Michael 
Massae of the Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc, into a plea bargain or into 
plea[d]ing out and further was made unaware of the penalties that could be 
imposed at sentencing but was instructed to be quiet aidd do what my coun[se]l 
advised. Further I am Not Guilty 
See Letters from I roy Briner to Judge Adkins, date si an mod September ' \. 2008 
(attached as Addendum B). Mr. Brinar's motion was fin 11 ailci M.S sentencing date. 
ThereatU11, lln nnliu -. ml uppe^l wvu il: * -• cases late r 
consolidated for purposes of tliii ar *«. 
STATEMENT O F THE FACTS 
Mr. Brinar advances man) tactual aigumeni'. including (lull lit i linnk'd ion ihe 
ineffective assistance of coi insel an ::l 1:1 ic: (h i) v alidit; - of his guilty pleas, "which were not 
knowingly, intelligently; and voluntarily entered. In the future, the factual basis of his 
arguments will have to be made part of the record at an evidentiary he,* • ~ 
However, this i nun inusi liisi mala ri ihicshnld drtcnniiiiiiion a;-, no wlieilin [ III 
Brinar :.Kctionally able to even raise his arguments in this appeal 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
T h e issues M r . h* n?.r n o w ceeVc to r^jse are unt in h for nun)* -
appeal Assuming , <//•#*.•-,. !* < ! -^ .. - o h i s J u l v l , 
2008 pleas have merit, the time to have made such challenges would have been before the 
3^_ 
August 22, 2008, sentencing proceeding. Notwithstanding the sympathetic claim that 
prior counsel had misled or misinformed him when he changed his plea, the plain 
language of the applicable statute and accompanying case law precludes review on a 
direct appeal. Consequently, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider such issues. The 
remedy for Mr. Brinar is through post-conviction relief or under Rule 65C of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. BRINAR IS JURISDICTIONALLY BARRED FROM 
RAISING ISSUES RELATED TO HIS JULY L 2008 GUILTY PLEAS 
Existing authority is quite clear on whether Mr. Brinar, who now seeks to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, entered on July 1, 2008, is precluded from doing so on direct 
appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(b) states, "A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no 
contest, except for a plea held in abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is 
announced/' Id. In this case, no motion was made to withdraw the pleas before 
sentencing. Accordingly, after the trial court's imposition of sentence, rendered on 
August 22, 2008, the statute stripped Mr. Brinar of the ability to withdraw his guilty 
pleas. 
Case law similarly prevents Mr. Brinar from withdrawing his pleas despite claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, exceptional circumstances, or plain error. State v. 
Tenorio, 156 P.3d 854, 2007 UT App 92 (attached as Addendum C). The issues raised in 
Tenorio would be analogous to the issues raised by Mr. Brinar, but like in Tenorio, such 
issues may not be raised on direct appeal. Accord State v. Connie Sue Lebow, 2006 UT 
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App 27, Case No. 200500611-CA (filed February 2, 2006) (unpublished memorandum 
decision) ("Absent a timely motion to withdraw a plea, appellate courts lack jurisdiction 
to consider any issue attacking the guilty plea itself, including whether a defendant 
received ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea agreement.") 
Nevertheless, the statute and Tenorio set forth the procedural avenues for relief (in 
circumstances other than through a direct appeal). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-
6(c), "Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Id. Tenorio reflects the same option. 
"Defendants challenge to his guilty plea, having been made outside the time period 
specified by statute, can only be pursued under ... [the] Post-Conviction Remedies Act, 
and rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Tenorio, 2007 UT App 92, f 8, 156 P.3d 
854 (citing State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, \ 6, 148 P.3d 990). Such avenues of relief are 
the only available remedies to Mr. Brinar, who is attempting to withdraw his guilty pleas 
in this direct appeal. 
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639 
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), appellate counsel for Mr. Brinar files this "Anders" brief and seeks 
permission from this Court to withdraw from the appeal. As of March 6, 2009, appellate 
counsel (or his office) have caused to be delivered a copy of this drafted brief to Mr. 
Brinar for his review. Moreover, during the same approximate time period, appellate 
counsel discussed the above principles with Mr. Brinar. 
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Counsel certifies that during his discussions with Mr. Brinar, no additional issues 
were raised in regards to this direct appeal. Mr. Briner also memorialized in writing that 
he has no corrections, edits, or additional issues to add to the brief. In the future, Mr. 
Brinar1 does not want to be foreclosed from raising appropriate plea issues (e.g. his pleas 
were not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily) and companion ineffective 
assistance of counsel issues (e.g. at or about the time of the plea, counsel exerted coercive 
tactics, gave improper advice, and failed to communicate properly). However, 
notwithstanding the present jurisdictional bar on raising such issues on direct appeal, no 
other issues were presented for briefing. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant, Mr. Troy Brinar, respectfully requests this Court to examine 
the above-stated arguments to determine if any nonfrivolous claims may be appropriately 
advanced on direct appeal. It is also requested that counsel's Motion to Withdraw be 
granted. 
SUBMITTED this?/] day of March, 2009. 
Ronald S. Fujino 
Attorney for Mr. Brinar 
1
 A copy of this drafted brief was delivered to Mr. Brinar and it was also attached to a 
motion for extension of time, filed in this Court. 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVER^ 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be delivered the original and seven copies of 
the foregoing to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, two copies to the Utah Attorney General's 
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, and one copy to Mr. Troy Anthony Brinar, Offender No. 
137823, at the Utah State Prison, P.O. Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020-0250, thisTr^day 
of March, 2009. 
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Addendum A 
(Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 Withdrawal of Plea) 
(Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-101 et seq Post-Conviction Remedies Act) 
(Utah R. Civ. P. 65C Post-conviction relief) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6. Withdrawal of plea. 
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction. 
(2) (a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon leave of the court 
and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except for a plea held in 
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence is announced. Sentence may not be 
announced unless the motion is denied. For a plea held in abeyance, a motion to 
withdraw the plea shall be made within 30 days of pleading guilty or no contest. 
(c) Any challenge to a guilty plea not made within the time period specified in 
Subsection (2)(b) shall be pursued under Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies ActJ" 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-102. Replacement of prior remedies. 
(1) This chapter establishes the sole remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or 
sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies, including a direct 
appeal except as provided in Subsection (2). This chapter replaces all prior remedies for review, 
including extraordinary or common law writs. Proceedings under this chapter are civil and are 
governed by the rules of civil procedure. Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of 
a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) This chapter does not apply to: 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal 
offense; 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
or 
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-103. Applicability - Effect on petitions. 
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107, this chapter applies only 
to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1,1996. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3,2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-104. Grounds for relief- Retroactivity of rule. 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78B-9-106 or 78B-9-107, a person who has been convicted 
and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district court of original jurisdiction 
for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the conviction or sentence upon the following 
grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the United 
States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed under a statute that is in 
violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the 
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; 
(c) the sentence was imposed or probation was revoked in violation of the controlling 
statutory provisions; 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States 
Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate the conviction 
or sentence, because: 
(I) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the time of trial or 
sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any previously filed post-trial motion or 
post-conviction proceeding, and the evidence could not have been discovered through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence; 
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known; 
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence; and 
(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence 
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner guilty of the offense 
or subject to the sentence received; or 
(f) the petitioner can prove entitlement to relief under a rule announced by the United States 
Supreme Court, the Utah Supreme Court, or the Utah Court of Appeals after conviction and 
sentence became final on direct appeal, and that: 
(1) the rule was dictated by precedent existing at the time the petitioner's conviction or 
sentence became final; or 
(ii) the rule decriminalizes the conduct that comprises the elements of the crime for which 
the petitioner was convicted. 
(2) The court may not grant relief from a conviction or sentence unless the petitioner 
establishes that there would be a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome in light of 
the facts proved in the post-conviction proceeding, viewed with the evidence and facts 
introduced at trial or during sentencing. 
(3) The court may not grant relief from a conviction based on a claim that the petitioner is 
innocent of the crime for which convicted except as provided in Title 78B, Chapter 9, Part 3, 
Postconviction Testing of DNA, or Part 4, Post-Conviction Determination of Factual Innocence. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105. Burden of proof. 
(1) The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The court may not grant relief 
without determining that the petitioner is entitled to relief under the provisions of this chapter 
and in light of the entire record, including the record from the criminal case under review. 
(2) The respondent has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 
78B-9-106, but once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its 
existence by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106. Preclusion of relief - Exception. 
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or could have 
been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78B-9-107. 
(2) The state may raise any of the procedural bars or time bar at any time, including during 
the state's appeal from an order granting post-conviction relief, unless the court determines that 
the state should have raised the time bar or procedural bar at an earlier time. Any court may raise 
a procedural bar or time bar on its own motion, provided that it gives the parties notice and an 
opportunity to be heard. 
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)©, a person may be eligible for relief on a basis that the 
ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise that ground 
was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief. 
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one year after the cause 
of action has accrued. I 
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the following 
dates: 
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction, if no 
appeal is taken; 
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has% 
appeal is taken; 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme Court or the 
United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry of the decision on 
the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certiorari is filed; 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based; or 
(f) the date on which the new rule described in Subsection 78B-9-104(l)(f) is established. 
urisdiction over the case, if an 
(3) The limitations period is tolled for any period during which the petitioner was prevented 
from filing a petition due to state action in violation of the United States Constitution, or due to 
physical or mental incapacity. The petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the petitioner is entitled to relief under this Subsection (3). 
(4) The statute of limitations is tolled during the pendency of the outcome of a petition 
asserting: 
(a) exoneration through DNA testing under Section 78B-9-303; or 
(b) factual innocence under Section 78B-9-401. 
(5) Sections 77-19-8, 78B-2-104, and 78B-2-111 do not extend the limitations period 
established in this section. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 358, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-108. Effect of granting relief - Notice. 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either: 
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence; or 
(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or sentencing proceeding 
as appropriate. 
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed for five days. 
Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that 
the respondent will pursue a new trial or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no 
action. 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during the stay period 
that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver the order to the custodian 
of the petitioner. 
(c) If the respondent gives notice of intent to appeal the court's decision, the stay provided 
for by Subsection (2)(a) shall remain in effect until the appeal concludes, including any petitions 
for rehearing or for discretionary review by a higher court. The court may lift the stay if the 
petitioner can make the showing required for a certificate of probable cause under Section 
77-20-10 and URCP 27. 
(d) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the petitioner, the trial 
court may order any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, 
discharge, or other matters that may be necessary. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288,2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-109. Appointment of pro bono counsel. 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may, upon the request 
of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis to represent the petitioner in the 
post-conviction court or on post-conviction appeal. Counsel who represented the petitioner at 
trial or on the direct appeal may not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section. 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the following factors: 
(a) whether the petition or the appeal contains factual allegations that will require an 
evidentiary hearing; and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require the assistance 
of counsel for proper adjudication. 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot be the 
basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 288, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-110. Appeal - Jurisdiction. 
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction 
relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78A-3-102 or 78A-4-103. 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-201. Post-conviction remedies — 30 days. 
A post-conviction remedy may not be applied for or entertained by any court within 30 days 
prior to the date set for execution of a capital sentence, unless the grounds for application are 
based on facts or circumstances which developed or first became known within that period of 
time. 
i 
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C 
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under 
Utah Code Title 78B, Chapter 9, Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the 
clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The 
petition should be filed on forms provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue 
on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of 
venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in 
relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of 
the conviction or sentence may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause 
shown. The petition shall state: 
(c)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place o incarceration; 
(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of 
proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those 
proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to 
relief; 
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of 
probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate 
proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the appeal; 
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior 
post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those 
proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior proceeding; and 
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons 
why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the 
trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the 
petition: 
(d)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct 
appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil 
proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and 
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss 
authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of 
which shall be filed with the petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the 
judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the 
clerk shall assign the case in the normal course. 
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is 
apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in 
the petition appears frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the 
claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. 
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with 
the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or 
conclusions of law. 
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the 
pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(g)(2)(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(g)(2)(c) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing 
of the petition. 
(g)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave 
to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good 
cause shown. 
(g)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a 
case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
(h) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the 
petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition 
that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and 
memorandum by mail upon the respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or 
sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other 
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
(I) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by 
mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of 
time as the court may allow, the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of 
the petition that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the 
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for service by mail) 
after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by 
memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless 
ordered by the court. 
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing 
or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the 
conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. 
At the prehearing conference, the court may: 
(j)(l) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(j)(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(j)(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the 
evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing 
conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The prehearing conference may be 
conducted by means of telephone or video conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before 
the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the petitioner is 
confined. 
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon 
motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is 
necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant 
transcript or court records. 
(m) Orders; stay. 
(m)(l) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony 
conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give 
written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a 
new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed by 
these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
(m)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the 
stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order 
to release the petitioner. 
(m)(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial 
court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, 
discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any 
party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be 
paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody 
of the Department of Corrections, Utah Code Title 78 A, Chapter 2, Part 3 governs the manner 
and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for fees and 
costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and 
reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes 
governing appeals to those courts. 
Addendum B 
(Letters from Troy Briner to Judge Adkins, dated circa September 11, 2008) 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TROY ANTHONY BRINAR, 
Defendant. 
LETTER FROM DEFENDANT 
Case No: 081400122 
Judge: ROBERT ADKINS 
Date: September 15, 200* 
Court reviewed letters from the defendant, a copy of the letters 
were sent to the District Attorney's office and to Mike Masse, LDA. 
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3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
TROY ANTHONY BRINAR, 
Defendant 
LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT 
Case No: 081401032 
Judge: ROBERT ADKINS 
Date: September 15, 200£ 
Court reviewed letters from the Defendant, a copy of the letters 
were mailed to the District Attorney's office and to Mike Masse, 
LDA. 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
TROY ANTHONY BRINAR, 
Defendant 
LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT 
Case No: 081401207 
Judge: ROBERT ADKINS 
Date: September 15, 2008 
The Court reviewed the letters from the defendant, a copy of the 
letters were mailed to the District Attorney's office and the Mike 
Masse, LDA. 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
TROY ANTHONY BRINAR, 
Defendant 
LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT 
Case No: 081401257 
Judge: ADKINS, ROBERT 
Date: September 15, 200! 
Court reviewed the letters from the defendant, a copy of the 
letters were mailed to the District Attorney's office and the Mike 
Masse, LDA. 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST JORDAN CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TROY ANTHONY BRINAR, 
Defendant, 
LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT 
Case No: 081401312 
Judge: ADKINS, ROBERT 
Date: September 15, 200! 
Court reviewed letters from the defendant, copies of the letters 
were mailed to the District Attorney's office and to Mike Mase, 
LDA. 
3RD DIST. COURT - WEST JORDAN 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
TROY ANTHONY BRINAR, 
Defendant 
LETTERS FROM DEFENDANT 
Case No: 081401441 
Judge: ADKINS, ROBERT 
Date: September 15, 200* 
The Court reviewed the letters from the defendant, copies of the 
letters were mailed to the District Attorney's office and to Mike 
Masse, LDA> 
Addendum C 
State v. Tenorio, 156 P.3d 854, 2007 UT App 92 
This opinion is subject to revision befor^ 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
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OPINION 
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2007 UT App 92 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 041904383 
The Honorable Denise P. Lindberg 
Attorneys: Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Orme. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
"^1 Defendant Robert Osorio Tenorio appeals his convictions 
resulting from guilty pleas to communications fraud, a second 
degree felony, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1) (d) (Supp. 
2006), and forgery, a third degree felony, see id. § 76-6-501(3) 
(2003). We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
H2 Defendant is in this country illegally, but has lived and 
worked here for several years. In 1996, an individual on the 
street gave Defendant a social security number, and Defendant 
later obtained a corresponding social security card. Although 
the card was counterfeit, the social security number was valid 
and belonged to a now-deceased individual from New York. In 
1999, Defendant used the social security card to apply for a 
mortgage guaranteed by the United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD). The application was approved, and 
Defendant received a loan in the amount of $83,871, secured by 
his newly purchased home. Defendant subsequently defaulted on 
the loan, which caused HUD to lose over $50,000. 
f3 Eventually, the State charged Defendant with forgery and 
communications fraud, or alternatively, theft by deception. On 
April 22, 2005, Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the 
State whereby he pleaded guilty to forgery and communications 
fraud. Before entering Defendant's plea, the trial court 
verified on the record that Defendant understood the nature of 
the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty and that he was 
"severely limiting [his] appeal rights." The trial court also 
explained to Defendant the elements of his crimes and the 
associated penalties. Finally, after hearing the State's 
intended evidence, the trial court concluded that those facts 
established the elements of the crimes with which Defendant was 
charged. 
14 On July 22, 2005, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a 
suspended term of 365 days in jail. Defendant did not move to 
withdraw his guilty plea prior to the court's imposition of 
sentence. One month after the sentencing hearing, the State 
moved to correct Defendant's sentence. At an October 7, 2005 
hearing on the State's motion, the trial court corrected 
Defendant's sentence and ordered him to serve two suspended 
prison terms: zero to five years for the forgery conviction and 
one to fifteen years for the communications fraud conviction. On 
October 20, 2005, Defendant filed a notice of appeal "from the 
final judgment/order rendered against him on the 7th day of 
October, 2005." 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1*5 Defendant urges us to hear his appeal and reverse his guilty 
plea under the doctrines of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
exceptional circumstances, and plain error. In response, the 
State claims that we lack jurisdiction to consider Defendant's 
appeal. "An appellate court's 'determination of whether it has 
jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a question of law.'" State v. 
Norris, 2002 UT App 305,1(5, 57 P.3d 238 (quoting Miller v. USAA 
Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6,118, 44 P.3d 663). Defendant 
alternatively asserts that our statutory scheme and related case 
law governing appellate review of guilty pleas is 
unconstitutional. "Constitutional challenges to statutes present 
questions of law, which [appellate courts] review for 
correctness." State v. Green, 2004 UT 76,1)42, 99 P.3d 820 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
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i[6 Although Defendant raises various challenges to his guilty 
plea, this court cannot review his claims unless Defendant has 
complied with Utah code section 77-13-6(2) . See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-13-6(2) (Supp. 2006). Accordingly, to challenge a guilty 
plea, a defendant must move to withdraw the plea prior to the 
trial court's announcement of sentencing. See id. at § 77-13-
6(2)(b) ("A request to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . shall be 
made by motion before sentence is announced."). A defendant's 
failure to do so precludes a challenge to that plea, except as 
provided under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, see id. §§ 78-
35a-101 to -304 (2002 & Supp. 2006), and rule 65C of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, see Utah R. Civ. P. 65C. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (c) (stating that any challenge to a guilty plea 
not made prior to sentencing "shall be pursued under . . . [the] 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure"). 
t7 Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has interpreted the 
language of Utah Code section 77-13-6(2) to be jurisdictional. 
See Grimmett v. State, 2007 UT 11,18, 570 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
("Section 77-13-6 (2) (b) imposes a jurisdictional bar on late-
filed motions to withdraw guilty pleas . . . ." (quotations and 
citation omitted)); State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,120, 114 P.3d 
585 (stating that "section 77-13-6(2)(b) is indeed 
jurisdictional"); State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,^3, 40 P.3d 630 
(refusing to consider, for lack of jurisdiction, the defendant's 
attacks on his guilty plea because he failed to comply with 
section 77-13-6(2)); see also Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61,1)36, 
122 P.3d 628 ("Any challenge to . . . a plea agreement, or to 
waivers contained therein, may only be undertaken following a 
timely motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea."). Thus, a 
defendant's failure to comply with section 77-13-6(2) precludes 
this court from reviewing his or her appeal from a guilty plea. 
1j8 Here, Defendant pleaded guilty on April 22, 2005, and did 
not move to withdraw or otherwise challenge his plea prior to 
sentencing on July 22, 2005. Once the trial court entered its 
sentencing order, Defendant lost his right to withdraw his guilty 
plea. Therefore, Defendant's failure to comply with section 77-
13-6(2) precludes our review of his appeal because we lack 
jurisdiction to do so.1 See Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at M19-20. As 
xThe State additionally argues that Defendant's appeal was 
untimely because he did not file his notice of appeal within 
thirty days of the entry of his guilty plea, as required by rule 
4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. App. P. 
4. We do not reach this issue because Defendant's failure to 
(continued...) 
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such, "Defendant's challenge to his guilty plea, having been made 
outside the time period specified by statute, can only be pursued 
under . . . [the] Post-Conviction Remedies Act, and rule 65C, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 
76,1|6, 148 P. 3d 990 (quotations and citation omitted). 
i[9 Defendant argues at length that despite his failure to 
comply with section 77-13-6(2), we may review his claim under 
ineffective assistance of counsel, exceptional circumstances, or 
plain error. Defendant concedes that current case law prevents 
us from reviewing his claim under plain error and ineffective 
assistance. See, e.g. , State v. Melo, 2001 UT App 392,114, 40 
P.3d 646 (holding that court lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
defendant's plain error and ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims due to the defendant's failure to timely move to withdraw 
his guilty plea). Nonetheless, Defendant asks us to overturn 
this precedent.2 This we cannot do because we are bound by our 
previous decisions as well as the decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court. "Vertical stare decisis . . . compels a court to follow 
strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court." State v. 
Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) . Moreover, in 
accordance with horizontal stare decisis, "the first decision by 
a court on a particular question of law governs later decisions 
by the same court." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 
1993). While a court will overrule its own precedent in the 
limited circumstances where it is "'clearly convinced that the 
rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of 
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by 
departing from precedent,1" State v. Bennett, 2000 UT 34,^8, 999 
P.2d 1 (quoting Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (additional quotations 
and citation omitted)), such circumstances are not present here. 
1110 Finally, Defendant asserts that section 77-13-6(2) 
unconstitutionally violates "the right to counsel, violates the 
due process right to a knowing and voluntary plea, prevents 
1
 (. . .continued) 
timely move to withdraw his guilty plea is dispositive. 
defendant also claims that this case involves a "rare 
procedural anomaly" and that we may review his claim under 
exceptional circumstances to avoid "manifest injustice." See 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) . However, 
because Defendant cites no authority permitting us to circumvent, 
via the exceptional circumstances doctrine, the legion of cases 
explaining our lack of jurisdiction and the requirements of 
section 77-13-6(2), see Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2) (Supp. 2006), 
we decline to do so. 
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[r]ule 11 [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] protections 
for defendants, and denies the right to a full and fair appeal." 
While we recognize the fundamental logic of Defendant's position, 
we have no jurisdiction to address these claims. It is worth 
noting, however, that the Utah Supreme Court has determined that 
the "jurisdictional bar" imposed by Utah Code section 77-13-6(2) 
is "constitutionally permissible." Merrill, 2005 UT 34 at ^1. 
CONCLUSION 
i|ll Because we lack jurisdiction to hear Defendant's attack on 
his guilty plea in this direct appeal, we affirm his convictions 
for communications fraud, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1)(d), 
and forgery, see id. § 76-6-501(3). 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
H12 WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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